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Abstract 
A public goods environment was constructed to simulate a dilemma in which corporate 
managers choose between acts of corporate social responsibility and acts of profitability. 
An experiment was conducted to determine the effect of a penalty for contributing above 
a specific level. The penalty has significant effects, encouraging free riding and 
suppressing contributions at all levels, even though most contributions would not have 
triggered the penalty. 
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 Chapter I. INTRODUCTION.  
There is a growing trend in legal scholarship toward a belief that over-regulation 
of corporation stunts corporate morality.  This belief, developed extensively by Lawrence 
E. Mitchell in his widely cited Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: 
An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 477 (1995), argues 
that extensive regulation of corporate behavior reduces corporate social responsibility. 
This argument has two elements.  The first of which is the general requirement 
under law that corporate actors act in the best interests of their shareholders.  This, 
according to Mitchell and others, translates to primarily mean profit maximization (a 
traditional assumption of neoclassical economic theory).  Mitchell suggests that this duty 
restricts the role of corporate actors and discourages social responsibility when such 
responsibility would reduce profits. 
Mitchell also claims that strict regulation for corporations regarding such things 
as product safety, treatment of the environment, and working conditions reduces the 
morality of the corporate actor, much in the same way that strict rules (“constraints”) can 
limit a child’s moral development (Piaget 1965). 
I propose to test the effect of rule-based regulation on corporate actors’ self-
regulation with an experiment in behavioral economics. 
A. Research problem.  
Do fiduciary duties constrain corporate social responsibility? Mitchell (1995) 
posits that they do. Specifically, he writes that corporate managers’ fiduciary duty of 
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loyalty, which includes the duty to act in shareholders’ best interests, is widely 
interpreted as a duty to maximize corporate profits. Given the choice between a more 
profitable action and a more socially responsible action, corporate managers will choose 
the more profitable action because they are bound by fiduciary duties to do so. Mitchell 
concludes by stating that he has no way to prove that corporate managers will act more 
morally in the absence of shareholder litigation threat: “I believe that if corporate actors 
are left to their own devices in the society we currently have and have an awareness that 
society expects them to behave in a corporate context as complete members of that 
society, corporate actors on balance will behave well.”  
The problem, then, is to test Mitchell’s assertion. A “real world” experiment 
would involve a change to state law that reduces the standards to which shareholders hold 
corporate managers. A legislative change like that seems unlikely, and in any event is not 
a viable option for academic research. Some states have enacted constituency legislation 
(which allows corporate managers to consider the interests of broad constituencies well 
beyond their shareholders), but even those states have not gone so far as to alter the basic 
directive to corporate managers to maximize shareholder profits. Perhaps a laboratory 
experiment, using a game theoretic model designed to simulate corporate managers’ 
decision-making, can shed light on the issue. 
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B. Need for the research.  
1. Increasing Corporate Social Responsibility 
This paper borrows the definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001), describing it as “actions that appear to further some 
social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law.” In other 
words, CSR is what can happen when firms make choices between a private benefit and a 
public benefit. For many of these choices, the potential public benefit greatly outweighs 
the private benefit and therefore increases social welfare. This is often the case where 
there negative externalities arise from a profitable action, or, inversely, when positive 
externalities arise from an unprofitable action. 
Corporate social responsibility (defined in more detail in Section I.D below) 
describes the choice of a firm to sacrifice a private benefit for a public benefit, such as 
incurring higher input costs to purchase more environmentally friendly components. The 
public benefits can potentially vastly outweigh the private costs. 
In those cases, the potential social benefit of this research is clear: exploring this 
tension between public and private benefit will inform policymakers on how best to 
structure corporate fiduciary duties such that they can maximize social welfare. 
Improving policy can potentially lead to diverse and substantial social benefits. 
This paper will not definitively answer the questions of whether or exactly how 
we should tinker with fiduciary duties for corporate managers. These questions are 
difficult and multi-faceted. See Section I.E, below. Nonetheless, policy choices can and 
should consider these issues. 
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2. Increasing Efficient Provision of Public Goods, Specifically and Generally 
This paper could have a specific effect on social welfare if its results contribute to 
and guide policy on corporate fiduciary duties. CSR may have some comparative 
advantages as a way to provide public goods over government and nonprofit sectors. 
Besley and Gatach (2007) argue that in the case of perfect government, CSR can provide 
public goods at the same level as individual voluntary contribution, but if government is 
imperfect, CSR can provide public goods at an even higher level. They write: 
[P]rivate contributions to reduce public bads may not be 
very effective. NGO’s may use resources to lobby or curtail 
the bad activities, but may not have a technology to directly 
reduce the quantity of a public bad. However, this is not the 
case for many instances of CSR where the corporation may 
itself be the perpetrator of the bad.  
 
If CSR can be harnessed to provide public goods (or equivalently, to reduce 
public bads), policymakers may be able to increase social welfare. 
This paper could also have a more general effect as it informs the broader body of 
economics knowledge. This experiment will contribute to the literature on public goods 
games, also known as the voluntary contribution mechanism. It appears that no one has 
studied the effects of penalizing underperformance in a public goods game. If such a 
penalty does have an effect, broad applications could exist. Public goods games are used 
to model a variety of situations in which public goods are provided by private 
contributions, including climate change (Hasson 2009), environmental technology “green 
markets” (Kotchen 2006), and labor unions (Martin et al. 1991). Adding or removing 
penalties (as appropriate to the results of this experiment) could be a useful way adjust 
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the parameters of real-life public goods games and thereby encourage the provision of 
public goods in circumstances well beyond corporate decision making.  
C. Nominal definitions.  
1. Corporate Social Responsibility 
This paper borrows the definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001), describing it as “actions that appear to further some 
social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law.” In other 
words, CSR is what can happen when firms make choices between a private benefit and a 
public benefit. For many of these choices, the potential public benefit greatly outweighs 
the private benefit and therefore increases social welfare. This is often the case where 
negative externalities arise from a profitable action, or, inversely, when positive 
externalities arise from an unprofitable action. CSR that reduces social welfare is also 
conceivable, if ill-advised. A direct wealth transfer with no significant transaction costs 
might have no net social welfare change, and a direct wealth transfer with significant 
transaction costs may reduce social welfare. 
2. Fiduciary Duties 
Under case law in Delaware (where most American corporations are 
incorporated), corporate decision-makers, as officers of a firm, owe that firm fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). The duty of 
loyalty requires fiduciaries to act in the best interests of the corporation, and that includes 
a duty not to waste corporate resources. A corporate officer in breach of fiduciary duties 
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risks being sued by the corporation’s shareholders in a derivative suit. Even if the suit is 
unsuccessful, or if the firm’s insurance indemnifies the officer, the experience is not a 
welcome one. The defendant could be fired, suffer reputational harm, and be compelled 
to participate in the legal process, for example by sitting for a deposition. 
D. Context.  
Mitchell (1995) argues that a tension exists between a desire to grant corporate 
managers broad discretion on one hand and a desire to ensure their loyalty to the 
corporation on the other. The fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation resolves this 
tension by requiring corporate managers to act in the best interests of the corporation. 
Lorsch & MacIver (1989) conclude that corporate managers, despite feeling moral 
obligations to serve broad constituencies (such as employees, creditors, customers, the 
public, etc.) believe that their legal duty is to the shareholders.  
The “interests of the corporation” (that managers must consider) have been 
broadened somewhat. For example, Wolfe (1993) describes early legal battles over the 
legitimacy of corporate donations to not-for-profit institutions and the provision of 
extraordinary benefits to employees. These battles resulted in judicial and legislative 
actions that increase the constituencies corporate managers may consider when making 
decisions to some degree, although there are limits. 
Mitchell (1995) believes that corporate managers will behave more responsibly 
and morally if certain legal constraints on their conduct are removed. Why does he 
believe this? “A complete answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Article (and 
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perhaps my abilities), for it requires the development and defense of a theory of human 
nature and substantive goods.” 
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 Chapter II. THEORY. 
A. Overview.  
This section begins with a discussion of public goods games, social dilemma in 
which subjects make decisions about whether to make contributions toward a public good 
or keep resources for themselves. Public goods game experiments provide researchers 
with a mechanism by which they can test ideas about how to encourage private provision 
of public goods in spite of individual incentives to free ride off others’ efforts. 
Next, this section discusses various experiments in public goods environments, 
including several factors that are known to affect contributions to the public good. 
Although economic theory predicts that all subjects will free ride, experiments in a 
laboratory setting have shown repeatedly that many subjects do not free ride, at least at 
first. 
This section then explores the payoff structure of a public goods game, including 
the effect of tweaking various parameters and the difference between linear public goods 
environments and provision point public goods environments. 
Finally, the section explores the phenomenon of strategic corporate social 
responsibility and observes a link between executive compensation and corporate 
performance.  
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B. Literature.  
1. The theoretical basis of public goods games 
The public goods game, like the prisoner’s dilemma game, represents a social 
dilemma situation in which subjects make decisions and the outcome for each is 
dependent on the decisions of others. Subjects can achieve the highest possible outcome 
for the collective by cooperating. However, each individual subject has an incentive not 
to cooperate, while reaping the benefits of others’ cooperation (or “free ride”) (Volk 
2011). 
Also thought of as the “N-person prisoner’s dilemma” (Santos 2008), in the 
simplest form, each subject is given an endowment w, and makes a decision between 
cooperating (contributing a cost c to the “group exchange”) or defecting (contributing 
nothing). The aggregate contribution is multiplied by an enhancement factor r and is then 
equally distributed among all N members of the group.  
Hence, defectors get the same benefit as the contributors at no cost (id.). Public 
goods games are interesting dilemmas where r < N, meaning that the amount subject i 
contributes (ci) will be less than i’s share of the return. In other words, the marginal per 
capita return for each unit of contribution ci is less than one. If the game were constructed 
such that r ≥ N, every contribution would have a certain, profitable return, and full 
contribution (ci = wi) would be a strictly dominant strategy for all players.  
In a slightly more sophisticated version of the public goods game, each subject 
has an endowment, from which the subject may contribute any amount (as opposed to all 
or nothing) to a group exchange representing a public good that returns an enhanced 
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(multiplied by r) payoff divided among all the subjects. In some framings, the group 
exchange is called the “public exchange,” and any part of the endowment not contributed 
to the public exchange is deposited in the subject’s own “individual exchange,” which is 
then paid out to the subject with no multiplier. One can interpret the amount contributed 
as a measure of cooperative behavior in this scenario more acutely than in the all-or-
nothing contribution scenario (Denant-Boemont 2007). The payoff to each subject i is 
given by: 
 
The enhancement factor r is what makes the group exchange a public good 
because the group exchange can return substantially more than the fixed amount set for 
the individual exchange (Marwell 1981). In other words, although low or no contribution 
may be a dominant strategy, high or full contribution is Pareto-superior (Isaac 1989). 
No matter what strategies other subjects use, subject i’s best response is to 
contribute nothing because subject i’s return to ci will always be less than ci when 
.1 The dominant strategy for each subject i, then, is  
 
And that is also therefore the Nash equilibrium. An underlying assumption of 
microeconomics is that subjects act rationally to maximize their own self-interested 
utility (Nicholson 2005). If that holds in a public goods game, they will each contribute 
nothing. However, this assumption tends to be unreliable. 
1 This is always the case in a public goods game. In cases where when , public and private interests 
are aligned and there is no dilemma. 
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2. Basic public goods game experiment features 
There has been a considerable amount of experimental research on public goods 
environments. Isaac and Walker (1987a) and Ledyard (1995) provide excellent surveys of 
the literature, and Zelmer (2003) offers a meta-analysis of a variety of public goods 
experiments. 
Experiments involving public goods games show that many subjects make 
nonzero contributions, their direct incentives notwithstanding (Ledyard 1995, Zelmer 
2003). Seminal public goods experiments showed a wide range of strategies in single 
rounds, with approximately 30% contributing nothing, 20% fully contributing, and 50% 
making partial contributions (Isaac 1984; Isaac 1985). 
Experiments involving repeated treatments have shown that contribution levels 
decrease over time. Although initial contribution levels are substantial, they generally 
decrease over time until contribution levels converge near zero (Denant-Boemont 2007 
citing Isaac et al. 1985; Andreoni 1988; Isaac and Walker 1998a; Ledyard 1995). 
This convergent behavior may appear to be the result of strategic behavior or of 
learning. That is, according to the strategy hypothesis, some subjects may have engaged 
in a strategy of early high contributions to encourage other subjects to make high 
contributions, and after seeing low participation, modified their own contributions. The 
learning hypothesis suggests that subjects did not understand that contributing nothing 
was a dominant strategy, and after a few rounds the subjects learned that contributing 
nothing benefitted them more than contributing something. Andreoni (1988) addressed 
these hypotheses by parsing out the potential effects of strategies and learning and found 
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them lacking. Specifically, he compared contributions from subjects who stayed in the 
same group through ten rounds against contributions from subjects who were randomly 
reassigned to new groups after each of ten rounds, as strategy would be useless in the 
latter. He also, after ten rounds, instructed some groups to start again and play another ten 
rounds. For those groups that did so and stayed within the same groups, their round 11 
contributions were largely the same as their round 1 contributions, which suggests that 
the decay toward zero contributions is not the result of learning, either.  
3. Payoff structure in public goods games 
Several experiments have tested the effects of altering the enhancement factor r 
applied to the total contributions before distributing it among subjects. Experimenters 
rarely set r = 1 (Zelmer 2003), which reflects the nature of externalities as something 
other than zero-sum games. Many experiments set r = 1.2 (Isaac et al 1989). 
Experiments show that subjects in high payoff conditions (environments with 
high r values) contribute more than individuals in low payoff conditions. This is true for 
initial contributions (Zelmer 2003), and it is also true for total contributions in repeated 
treatments (Isaac et al. 1989). 
A subject’s marginal per capita return (MPCR) on the subject’s contribution is a 
function of both the enhancement factor r and the group size N. Specifically, the function 
is usually given by: 
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Although the model discussed so far involves continuous returns to any subject’s 
contributions, some experimenters, including Marwell and Ames (1981) and Dawes et al. 
(1986), have created more discrete public goods environments using provision points. 
That is, subjects in a group must contribute some minimum amount to earn a payoff from 
a public account. If that minimum is not reached, the public good is considered “not 
provided,” and the subjects receive either nothing or very little from the public account. 
On the other hand, if the group does reach the provision point, the public good is 
provided, and the group receives a sizeable return on its investment in the public account. 
A unique feature of provision points is that if a subject believes that the other group 
members’ contributions will total just below the provision point, that subject will see a 
very high return from contributing to the public account. 
4. Marketing CSR 
Some firms engage in CSR conduct and make sure that consumers know it. Baron 
(2001) calls this strategic corporate social responsibility: attempts to increase profits by 
attracting socially responsible consumers. Bagnoli and Watts (2003) provide numerous 
examples of this phenomenon, including cause-related marketing (that is, donating a 
portion of profits or otherwise linking charitable donations to sales levels) and lump-sum 
corporate donations to “worthy” causes or “green” activities, which implicitly link the 
contribution to sales of the company’s products, such as support for public 
radio/television, health research, etc. 
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This kind of CSR is strategic because it is calculated to increase profits.2 That is, 
consumers have to be willing to pay for the firm’s voluntary increase in its marginal 
costs. But if they are in fact willing to pay, and willing to pay a premium higher than the 
firm’s marginal costs, the firm’s increased marginal costs can ultimately increase profits. 
In Bagnoli (2003)’s model of strategic CSR, private provision of a public good becomes 
a by-product of product-market competition between firms. 
5. Corporate managers’ compensation 
Compensation for corporate managers correlates strongly with firm performance, 
as measured by the firm’s annual returns. In a survey of executive compensation 
spanning the years 1980-1994, Hall and Liebman (1998) discovered a “strong link” 
between executive compensation and firm performance. They attribute virtually all of the 
sensitivity between pay and performance to changes in the value of executive stock and 
stock option holdings.  
C. Model.  
To model the circumstances of a corporate manager’s social responsibility 
dilemma, this experiment creates a fairly standard public goods game environment with 
one modification: a penalty for underperformance designed to model the cost of 
shareholder litigation. 
The Penalty Condition represents the current state of fiduciary duty law, where 
corporate managers face negative consequences for the firm’s underperformance. The 
2 Another way to view this strategic CSR is in the form of corporate managers trying to avoid negative 
externalities of the magnitude that might induce a successful boycott (Putnam 1993). 
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Regular Condition removes the penalty for underperformance to simulate a scenario in 
which corporate managers are insulated from liability for engaging the firm in acts that 
increase social welfare at the expense of profits. The Regular Condition is closer to 
typical public goods games and the Penalty Condition represents a departure from the 
traditional model. But the question to be tested is whether a departure from the current 
state of fiduciary duty law would positively affect aggregate social welfare, so in a sense, 
the Penalty Condition is the control condition and the Regular Condition is the variable 
condition. 
The independent variable, then, is the presence or absence of the penalty for 
underperformance, to determine whether fiduciary duties affect corporate social 
responsibility. The presence or absence more accurately represents a change to the 
environment than a change to a systemic or design variable (Ledyard 1995). The 
dependent variable to be measured is subjects’ contributions, which represent sacrificing 
private profits for the greater public good. If the independent variable has a significant 
negative effect on the dependent variable, the experiment will indicate that fiduciary 
duties do constrain corporate social responsibility. 
1. Regular condition 
This paper first describes the Regular Condition, which is simpler, and builds 
from there to establish the Penalty Condition. As in a typical public goods game, each 
subject i in the Regular Condition begins with an endowment wi and must choose to make 
a contribution ci in the range of [0, wi]. All N subjects’ contributions are added together, 
multiplied by an enhancement factor r, and then distributed evenly among all subjects. 
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The payoff function for subject i in the Regular Condition is therefore given by 
 
As in typical public goods games, all players receive the same benefit from the 
total contributions, regardless of whether they themselves contributed. Here, this 
represents one corporate manager’s expenditures to increase social welfare benefiting 
another corporate manager who desires an increase in social welfare. For example, a 
corporate manager who cares about protecting the environment will be pleased by 
another firm’s actions that benefit the environment beyond that other firm’s legal 
obligations to do so. 
The enhancement factor r must be less than the number of subjects N to create a 
dilemma. The reverse condition, r > N, could represent socially responsible actions that 
are also profitable. In the latter circumstance, corporate managers could choose actions 
that are both socially responsible and privately profitable, so fiduciary breach would not 
be implicated because shareholders could not point to a failure to maximize profits. 
Thus the amount each subject i contributes (ci) will be less than i’s share of the 
return. In other words, the marginal per capita return for each unit of contribution ci is 
less than one. For each subject, contributing any amount is a strategy dominated by 
contributing less. Mathematically, this aspect of marginal per capita return is given by: 
 
Game theory predicts a Nash equilibrium in each round where all subjects 
contribute nothing ( ). The Pareto-optimal outcome occurs when all subjects 
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contribute their entire endowments ( ). The experimental literature shows that, 
notwithstanding the theoretical Nash equilibrium, aggregate contribution levels regularly 
fall between nothing and everything ), with some subjects contributing 
nothing and others contributing at varying levels (Zelmer 2003).  
Each session consists of ten rounds with the same group members. This 
experiment employs multiple rounds to simulate a corporate management environment 
because business continues over time. If the goal is to simulate an ongoing business 
environment, limiting the game to a single round seems inappropriate. Further, Mitchell 
(1995) argued that fiduciary duties constrain corporate moral development. Expanding 
the game to multiple rounds allows an opportunity for subjects to develop. Also, 
shareholder litigation often follows annual or quarterly reporting that reveals performance 
(whether above or below expectations), and that reporting happens on a discrete but 
ongoing basis. 
2. Penalty condition 
The Penalty condition builds upon the Regular Condition’s public goods game by 
adding a penalty for underperformance. That is, the subject incurs a penalty for 
contributing more than a given threshold. This paper designates that threshold b (for 
“breach”) and the penalty p. This simulates a circumstance in which a subject plays the 
role of a corporate manager whose shareholders will sue for breach of fiduciary duty if 
the corporate manager earns profits ( ) below a specified level. A simple way to 
state this is that there will be a penalty if . 
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The penalty can alternatively be thought of as a modification to the marginal cost 
of contributing a token. Ordinarily, for any given subject, contributing a single token to 
the public account has a marginal cost of 1 token. However, contributing the bth token 
costs the subject 1 + p. All other tokens below or above the bth token still have a 
marginal cost of 1 token. 
The payoff function for subject i in the Penalty Condition is therefore given by the 
pair of functions 
 
(this is functionally identical to the Regular Condition described above) and 
 
Another way to write this function, in a single equation uses a nested function 
f(ci), which represents the penalty p of being sued for fiduciary breach, is given by 
 
where f(ci) = 0 if  > b and f(ci) = p if ( ) ≤ b.  
In this environment, too, the amount each subject i contributes (ci) will be less 
than i’s share of the return. So once again, the marginal per capita return for each unit of 
contribution ci is less than one. For each subject i, regardless of what any other subject 
decides, contributing any amount is a strategy dominated by contributing less. 
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The difference is that in this environment, high-contributing subjects will realize 
an even lower return than in the Regular Condition. A high-contributing subject’s payoff 
function could theoretically be negative, if 
 
As before, game theory predicts a Nash equilibrium where all subjects contribute 
nothing ( ). However, the Pareto-optimal outcome no longer necessarily occurs 
when all subjects contribute their entire endowments ( ). The social utility function 
is given by: 
 
Therefore if contributions are symmetrical, the social utility function is given by: 
 
One can see that if the penalty p (which, recall, is subtracted if wi drops below the 
breach threshold b) is large enough relative to the enhancement factor r, it can offset the 
gains from the marginal contribution that triggers it. In fact, if p is quite large, it can 
conceivably cancel out marginal contributions all the way to 100% (where ci = wi). When 
p is that large, the Pareto-optimal outcome will be found just short of b, because up to 
that point, higher contributions increase aggregate payoffs.  
I considered provision points but declined to incorporate them into the model 
because they do not reflect the situation faced by a corporate manager. For some public 
goods, such as organization members hiring a lobbyist to represent their collective 
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interest (Dawes et al. 1986), the public good cannot be provided unless a minimum 
aggregate contribution is reached. However, in the situation I wish to model, there is no 
minimum amount of aggregate corporate social responsibility that must be achieved for 
corporate managers to feel satisfaction for doing good. Rather, the returns from corporate 
social responsibility are more or less linear. For example, generating any lower amount of 
pollution is more desirable than generating a higher amount of pollution, and the 
desirability basically scales with the amount reduced. I also excluded provision points 
because Dawes et al. (1986) suggested that with provision points, there might be effects 
from a subject thinking that his or her contribution is the “critical” contribution. 
The penalty is a function of contributions only, and returns from the public 
account do not affect it. Returns from the public account represent achievements of social 
responsibility, which create what Andreoni (1989) calls a “warm glow” for the subject. 
However, returns from the public account do not satisfy the fiduciary impetus to generate 
profits for shareholders, and therefore they do not prevent a penalty for breach. 
Another way to think about the penalty condition is in terms of marginal cost of 
contributing one token to the public account. That is, in a given round, the gross marginal 
cost of each of the first b – 1 tokens (as well as all the tokens between b + 1 and w) a 
subject contributes to the public account is one token.3 However, the marginal cost of the 
bth token is 1 + p. That is, 1 for the token itself and p for the penalty. 
3 The net marginal cost would have to account for the marginal per capita return from the public account 
for each token a subject contributes, which is  
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D. Hypotheses.  
There are several ways to measure the effect of the penalty on contributions. For 
the first three hypotheses, each subject’s average contribution (over ten rounds) will be 
compared across the Regular and Penalty Conditions. 
H1: (overall-null):  In a public goods environment, a penalty for “over-
contributing” to the public good will not affect overall individual 
contribution levels. 
H2: (overall-reduction): In a public goods environment, a penalty for “over-
contributing” to the public good will decrease overall individual 
contribution levels. 
H3: (overall-increase): In a public goods environment, a penalty for “over-
contributing” to the public good will increase overall individual 
contribution levels. 
The next set of hypotheses compare individual contributions on a round-by-round 
basis. That is, the Regular Condition subjects’ contributions in the first round will be 
compared against the Penalty Condition subjects’ contributions in the first round, and the 
same for the second round, and so on. Although I list only three hypotheses in this 
category, each of them will apply to each of the ten rounds, so they could also be listed as 
thirty separate hypotheses. Instead of that, I will apply each of the three to each of the ten 
rounds. 
H4: (oneround-null): In a public goods environment, a penalty for “over-
contributing” to the public good will not affect individual contribution 
levels in each round. 
H5: (oneround-reduction): In a public goods environment, a penalty for “over-
contributing” to the public good will decrease individual contribution 
levels in each round. 
H6: (oneround-increase): In a public goods environment, a penalty for “over-
contributing” to the public good will increase individual contribution 
levels in each round. 
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For the next set, I will compare contributions of zero against non-zero 
contributions. Contributing zero is the dominant strategy, and the literature shows that 
although contributions generally start above zero, they tend to decay toward zero. 
Comparing zero contributions against non-zero contributions may reflect the speed at 
which a subject’s contributions decay toward zero, depending on the presence of the 
penalty. 
H7: (nonzero-null): In a public goods environment, a penalty for “over-
contributing” to the public good will not affect the number of individual 
non-zero contributions in each round. 
H8: (nonzero-reduction): In a public goods environment, a penalty for “over-
contributing” to the public good will decrease number of individual non-
zero contributions in each round. 
H9: (nonzero-increase): In a public goods environment, a penalty for “over-
contributing” to the public good will increase number of individual non-
zero contributions in each round. 
For the final set of hypotheses, I will compare contributions above the level at 
which subjects incur a penalty. If contributions in the Penalty Condition are similar to 
those in the Regular Condition, but cluster below the breach level, that may tell us 
something different about the effect of the penalty from what we might learn simply from 
contribution levels. 
H10: (abovebreachlevel-null): In a public goods environment, a penalty for 
“over-contributing” to the public good will not affect the number of 
individual above-breach-level contributions in each round. 
H11: (abovebreachlevel-reduction): In a public goods environment, a 
penalty for “over-contributing” to the public good will decrease number of 
individual above-breach-level contributions in each round. 
H12: (abovebreachlevel-increase): In a public goods environment, a penalty for 
“over-contributing” to the public good will increase number of individual 
above-breach-level contributions in each round. 
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Mitchell (1995) expects that removing the breach threshold will increase 
contributions because its presence constrains subjects (standing in for corporate 
managers) from developing their institutional morality. He expects that the breach 
threshold creates a psychological barrier to high levels of contribution. 
However, I expected that the presence or absence of a breach threshold will have 
no significant effect on individual or group contributions because executive 
compensation is so strongly correlated with firm performance. I expected that personal 
compensation would influence contribution levels strongly enough to obscure any effect 
from the presence of a penalty. 
E. Scope of the study.  
This study attempts to explore the effect, if any, of fiduciary duties on corporate 
managers’ propensity to choose social responsibility over private profits. It assumes that 
corporate managers would personally benefit from using corporate resources for social 
responsibility (perhaps by feeling that they have done the right thing—Andreoni’s “warm 
glow”), that using too many corporate resources for social responsibility risks inviting 
shareholder litigation which would be unpleasant for the corporate manager, and that a 
change to fiduciary duty law could prevent such litigation. 
The study is limited by these assumptions. To the extent that they are incorrect, 
the results of the experiment cannot be generalized to the broader policy question. 
The study makes no normative claims as to whether corporate fiduciary duties 
ought to be altered by legislation or any other means, regardless of the outcome of the 
experiment. 
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 Chapter III. METHODS.  
This experiment created a public goods game environment, employing common 
parameters and features of public goods games. However, this experiment imposed a 
penalty for contributing “too much” in one of two conditions.  
A. Design.  
1. Subjects and setting 
The experiment took place in a university classroom. I planned to have six 
sessions of twenty subjects each, for a total of 120 subjects, but unfortunately, my 
recruiting efforts were not as successful as I had hoped, so I ended up with 60 subjects. 
Three sessions were conducted on Friday, February 13, 2015 and the two others were 
conducted on Saturday, February 14, 2015. Each session had between two and four 
groups of five subjects each. 
As the subjects arrived, they were asked to sit wherever they pleased. If the 
number of subjects was not a multiple of five, an auction was held to pay enough students 
to leave the room until a multiple of five remained. I distributed packets to the subjects 
containing various documents. One of the documents assigned the subject to a group of 
five. The subjects were assigned randomly except that some effort was made to ensure 
that subjects sitting next to one another were not in the same group, to prevent distortions 
 24 
 
from some subjects knowing the contributions of other group members.4 This also 
ensured that the subjects could make decisions anonymously from other group members. 
Subjects were handed packets that assigned them to random groups. Each packet 
contained a consent form, instructions, a sheet of “tear strips” to use to submit decisions 
to the monitors, a record sheet, and a receipt.5 
Communication between participants was strictly prohibited and subjects were 
not given information that allows them to identify the other members in their group 
before, during, or after the experiment. In fact, to prevent subjects from inferring group 
affiliations by the order in which subjects received their payoff information, contribution 
tear sheets were returned to the subjects in a different order after each round. 
In each iteration of the game, monitors collected atear strip from each subject and 
entered the decisions into the computer. I then recorded the total contributions for the 
relevant group and the individual subject’s payoff on the tear strip and returned the forms 
to the subjects.  
A computer was stationed at the front of the room. The computer was 
programmed to automatically calculate payoffs as soon as contributions were entered. 
This allowed me to enter my data in real time as the experiment proceeded and reduced 
the risk of error in calculating the returns for each subject in each round. 
4 I also expect that any subjects that already knew each other would have sat together, and that this would 
eliminate any effects from preexisting friendships. Some of the corporate managers this experiment 
attempts to model probably socialize with one another, but I leave the effects of friendship on cooperation 
to other researchers. 
5 The actual consent form, instructions, tear strip sheet, record sheet, and receipt are attached as Appendix 
A. 
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No subjects were used in more than one session to prevent contamination from 
order effects, that is, to reduce the chance that subjects will be experienced and the 
effects of that experience on the subjects’ decisions. However, subjects that accepted a 
payment not to participate (to achieve even groups of five) were allowed to return to 
participate in a later session.  
2. Decision mechanism and parameters 
The environment reflects the two public goods games described above in Chapter 
II, Section C, with the following parameters for each of ten rounds: 
 = 10 
2 
N = 5 
b = 6 (where applicable) 
p = 2 (where applicable) 
So each subject receives an endowment of ten tokens, any portion of which they 
can either keep privately or contribute to a group account. Using contribution levels of 0–
10 should yield more precise results than an all-or-nothing contribution decision. Asking 
subjects to choose between contributing everything and contributing nothing really only 
captures whether a subject is on one side of the preponderance line or the other side. A 
binary decision like that fails to show how far from the line the subject is. Allowing 
subjects to choose within a range of 0–10 yields greater sensitivity to the effects of the 
independent variable (which in this experiment is actually a change to the environment). 
Further, allowing a range of choices more accurately represents the situation this 
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experiment attempts to model because corporate managers do not face the choice 
between spending their firms’ total profits on CSR and spending nothing at all. 
Zelmer’s (2003) meta-analysis of public goods games found that the median 
marginal per capita return in the experiments covered was 0.404. With no compelling 
reason to deviate from the previous experiments, this experiment is parameterized such 
that found that .  
In the Regular Condition, each subject i’s payoff function is given by: 
 
Each subject maximizes the subject’s own payoff by contributing zero tokens, but 
maximizes the total payoff (to the group) by contributing all ten tokens. Thus the 
experiment presents the classic social dilemma: the highest possible outcome for the 
group can be achieved by cooperating, but each individual group member benefits most 
from not cooperating. 
As described above, the Nash equilibrium in the model is zero contributions, 
regardless of parameters. The Pareto optimum occurs when every subject contributes the 
maximum ( ). 
In the Penalty Condition, each subject i’s payoff function is given by: 
 
(incurring a penalty) and 
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(not incurring a penalty). 
Again, each subject’s payoff is maximized by contributing zero tokens, but 
maximizing the total payoff (to the group) requires every subject to contribute all ten 
tokens. The Nash equilibrium in is condition is also zero contributions.  
Looking at the penalty as a modification to marginal cost, these parameters make 
it so that contributing the 6th token costs the subject 3 tokens, while all other tokens 
below or above the 6th token still have a marginal cost of 1 token. 
Under these parameters, if given subject contributes 5 tokens, the group will be 
better off in the aggregate than if that subject contributes 6 tokens, and the group will 
achieve the same total welfare as if that subject contributes 7 tokens (although 
distribution will differ). However, if a subject contributes 8 tokens, the group’s aggregate 
payoff climbs again, and upward again for the 9th and 10th token. The Pareto optimum 
therefore occurs when every subject contributes the maximum ( ). 
3. Instructions and record-keeping 
Subjects received a packet of documents that included written instructions 
explaining the experimental task in detail. I read the instructions aloud to the subjects and 
asked them to follow along. I then encouraged them to ask questions. In most sessions, 
the subjects had 1–3 questions.  
The written instructions explained the rules of the game, directed the subjects in 
the use of the included investment decision forms and the record sheet, provided a sample 
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payoff table, and explained how payoffs in the game would translate into actual 
earnings.6  
The instructions noted that group contributions are aggregated, doubled, and split 
evenly among the five members of each group, but subjects were not explicitly told the 
marginal per capita return of their contributions. 
The investment decision forms (“tear strips”) included in the packet were a means 
for subjects to submit their contributions and receive feedback on their payoffs for each 
round. The tear strips were numbered both by round (1–10) and by a subject identifier 
(e.g. B-1) so that they could be used as both investment decision forms and earnings 
report forms. The packet also included a record sheet on which the subjects could 
calculate their earnings for each round. The record sheet was laid out as a work sheet 
such that the subjects could input their individual contribution, the total group 
contribution, and their individual payoff for each round, and easily compute their share of 
the group returns and whether or not they incurred a penalty in that round (in applicable 
sessions). 
After each round, subjects were only told the total contribution of the public good 
for their own group. Subjects were not told the specific contributions of other individuals 
or the aggregate contributions for the other groups so that individual subjects would not 
be influenced by what other groups (or specific individuals in their own group) were 
doing. This information control may not be the most realistic way to model the behavior 
of corporate managers, who can probably see how other specific firms or even other 
6 The instructions for Regular and Penalty Conditions are attached in Appendix A. 
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industries are conducting their business. However, for this experiment I decided to keep it 
simple so I would have a better chance to isolate the effect of the penalty and not get a lot 
of noise from information effects. 
Subjects were instructed that one round would be selected at random to determine 
their earnings. The round was randomly selected at the end when a monitor blindly chose 
one of ten numbered poker chips from a coffee can. 
At the end of each session, the subjects were asked to calculate their earnings 
using the following formula: , where i is the randomly selected 
round. Subjects were asked to round up their earnings to the nearest quarter because it 
was administratively easier to make change if no smaller denominations were needed. 
After the subjects completed their receipt, they were called to the front of the 
room one by one to receive their payment. All subjects were paid their experimental 
earnings privately to maintain their anonymity. 
B. Sample.  
Subjects were University of Minnesota undergraduate students recruited from 
introductory-level undergraduate economics and applied economics courses 
(macroeconomics and microeconomics). I do not expect that the subjects have undergone 
advanced economics training because of the low level of the courses from which they 
were recruited, so the contribution-reducing effect of economics training found by 
Marwell and Ames (1981) should not be present. 
I personally visited most of the classes from which students were recruited and 
read from a script. I then answered any questions they had, almost all of which were 
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logistical (location, time, etc.). I collected email addresses from interested students (or, in 
larger classes, provided my email address and had them email me) and assigned them one 
of their preferred time slots.7 I then sent a reminder email to each of the subjects the day 
before their respective sessions. 
University students are a common pool from which experimenters draw subjects. 
Ball and Cech (1996), and more recently Fréchette (2011), found that this common pool 
makes a good proxy for professionals, including corporate managers, because in general, 
the results of economic experiments are similar regardless of whether the subjects are 
business professionals or college students. 
C. Measurement.  
Measurement is fairly straightforward in this experiment, because the subjects are 
asked to make quantitative contributions to a public account and keep the remainder. No 
opinions or other scalable data were collected. 
In advance of the actual experiment sessions, I conducted a trial run with a group 
of economics students. The trial run consisted of two rounds, one in the Regular 
Condition and one in the Penalty Condition. Afterward, I discussed the experiment at 
length with the subjects, particularly the instructions. Their feedback was useful both for 
modifying the instructions for clarity and fine-tuning the mechanics of administering the 
experiment, such as collecting and distributing contribution sheets. 
7 The actual recruitment script and sign-up sheets I used are attached in Appendix A.  
 31 
                                                 
 
D. Analysis.  
Because there is a single binary independent variable (Regular Condition versus 
Penalty Condition) and a single quantitative dependent variable, the Mann–Whitney 
rank-sum u-test is appropriate. Mann–Whitney can be used when observations from both 
groups are independent from each other (which is the case here, because the different 
conditions are applied in different sessions), the data are ordinal, and under the null 
hypothesis, the distributions of the Regular Condition and the Penalty Condition are the 
same. That is, if the presence of the penalty does not have an effect on contribution 
levels, median contributions should be equal in both groups. 
The Mann–Whitney test can be applied to each subject’s average contributions 
over all ten rounds and to each subject’s contributions in any given round. By converting 
the data into a binary of zero and non-zero contributions and calculating average numbers 
of zero contributions per subject, Mann–Whitney can also be used to determine whether a 
difference in free riding between the Regular and Penalty Conditions is significant. 
Finally, it can be used to detect a significant difference between contributions above the 
level that would incur a penalty in either condition. 
E. Validity.  
15 subjects were recruited for a session under the control group rules, allowing for 
three groups of five each. 45 subjects were recruited for the penalty group: 15 subjects in 
one session (allowing three groups of five) and 10 subjects in each of three additional 
sessions (allowing two groups of five per session).  
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All of the subjects received the same instructions, were overseen by the same 
experimenter, were all students from introductory-level undergraduate economics 
courses, and participated in the experiment in a similar physical environment (a 
university classroom). The only change between conditions that should affect outcomes 
at all is the change to the economic environment that imposes a penalty or not. 
Accordingly, the dependent variable (the environment change) should be the only factor 
causing a change in the dependent variable (contributions to the public account). 
The experiment should also be externally valid, as it has both facial validity and 
content validity. 
Using a public goods game to measure corporate social responsibility should be 
facially valid. As detailed above, corporate managers’ compensation generally correlates 
to performance of the company, and deciding to pursue actions that increase social 
responsibility (and personal satisfaction) but decrease profits appears to be quite similar 
to the dilemma faced by a subject in a public goods game. Similarly, the penalty for over-
contribution should closely model being sued for a breach of fiduciary duties. It seems 
unlikely that a corporate manager would be sued for using a small amount of corporate 
resources for the greater good, but when the resources used become large, that may 
attract attention from shareholders and their attorneys. 
The experiment has content validity to the extent that the subjects, a sample of 
university students, adequately represent the population of corporate managers when 
faced with the same incentives. This squares with the research surveyed by Ball and Cech 
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(1996) and Fréchette (2011), who found that the results of experiments with business 
professionals are similar to experiments with college students. 
However, the experiment model is not a perfect map of a business environment, 
and there may be a meaningful difference between corporate social responsibility, which 
may imbue the actor with Andreoni’s “warm glow” of altruism, and a subject in a public 
goods game whose cooperation helps other similarly situated subjects. The latter may 
cooperate strategically, to encourage other subjects to cooperate.  
F. Methodological assumptions.  
This experiment’s parameters reflect several assumptions. The first is that it maps 
the point at which a corporate manager would be sued for fiduciary breach at just over 
half of manager’s endowment. The endowment reflects something like that manager’s 
discretionary budget. Setting b = 6 means that using over half of the resources at the 
manager’s discretion will result in some chance for negative consequences that is not 
present if the manager makes a lower contribution. If b is unrealistically high, 
contribution levels may be inflated, and vice versa. 
A second assumption is the value of the harm from contributing above the breach 
level. Setting p = 2 is designed to deter contributions above the breach level, but also to 
reflect the reality of uncertainty. Although the experience of being sued (or fired) for 
fiduciary breach may warrant a higher penalty in the model, there is always some level of 
uncertainty about whether the lawsuit (or termination) will actually happen. Accordingly, 
p represents an expected value. The environment might be more realistic if p were higher 
but also a stochastic term; however, this complicates the model and potentially introduces 
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additional confusion among subjects. If p is unrealistically high, above-breach-level 
contributions will be biased downward, and vice versa (assuming that a larger penalty 
would deter contributions at a level that would incur the penalty, which seems like a safe 
assumption). 
Finally, setting r at 2 implies that corporate resources, when paid to shareholders, 
are only half as valuable as some other possible use. This assumes that the CSR in which 
corporate managers are likely to engage is twice as valuable as using the same resources 
as private profits. If r is incorrect or unrealistic, it should not adversely affect the results 
of this experiment because r is the same in both conditions. If r is too high, it should bias 
contributions upward in both conditions, and, if anything, make the experiment more 
sensitive to the effects of the penalty. 
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 Chapter IV. FINDINGS. 
It appears that imposing a penalty for over-contribution does deter contributions, 
whether measured by overall contributions or by contributions in individual rounds 
(although the latter is much less clear). Relatedly, the penalty appears to encourage 
complete free riding and discourage making contributions above the breach level. 
A. Results of application of method.  
Before the sessions began, I gave instructions and conducted two test rounds of 
the Penalty Condition on students in a graduate-level microeconomics class in the 
Applied Economics program. These test rounds and the discussion that followed helped 
me refine the instructions to the subjects so that they were clearer and more accurate. I 
also used this experience to make clarifying edits to the tear strips and record sheets. 
For the experiment itself, I conducted one session of the control treatment and 
three sessions of the variable treatment, for a total of 60 participants. The experiment 
typically lasted between 45–50 minutes and overall, participants’ earnings averaged 
$15.38 (standard deviation of $1.01, maximum of $17.25, minimum of $12.50). The 
Penalty Condition earnings averaged $15.58 (standard deviation of $0.62, maximum of 
$16.50, minimum of $14.50); the Regular Condition earnings averaged $15.31 (standard 
deviation of $1.11, maximum of $17.25, minimum of $12.50). 
I had hoped for 120 subjects, but I was only able to recruit 60 subjects. I decided 
to include 15 of those subjects in the Regular Condition and 45 in the Penalty Condition. 
I chose to do so because the Regular Condition has been tested extensively already, and it 
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will be easier to see whether my admitted small sample of Regular Condition subjects is 
representative of other subjects under similar conditions than to do the same with the 
Penalty Condition subjects, because to my knowledge, this is the only public goods 
experiment to impose a penalty for “over-contributing.” 
There was a minor aberration in one session of the Penalty Condition. Due to a 
bug in the payoff calculation software, above-breach-level contributions were not 
penalized in Rounds 2 through 4. When the error was discovered, the correction was 
announced to the subjects, who were also told that any penalties they should have 
incurred, but were not calculated in those rounds would not be counted when calculating 
their cash earnings. Notwithstanding, the effect of this appears to be minimal. Only four 
subjects made above-breach-level contributions during those rounds. Subject C-2 
contributed all 10 tokens consistently in all ten rounds, so C-2 apparently was not 
deterred by the penalty. Subjects A-2 and C-4 made contributions above the breach level 
in round 2 or 3, but had already reduced their contributions to below breach level by 
round 4. In fact, A-2 contributed 10 tokens in round 7, indicating a clear willingness to 
incur the penalty in that round. Subject C-5 similarly reduced contributions to below the 
breach level in round 5, but also made an above-breach-level contribution (8 tokens) in 
round 7. The bug was corrected and did not disrupt any other sessions. If there was an 
effect on contributions, it more likely came from publicly reaffirming the effect of the 
penalty to the entire group than from the erroneously inflating payoffs to specific 
subjects. 
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B. Descriptive analysis.  
1. Subjects’ average and median contributions 
Table 1 lists the average percentage of the endowment contributed to the public 
good in each round.8 For example, in the Regular Condition, the average subject 
contributed 40% of that subject’s endowment in the first round, 50.67% in the second 
round, and so on. 
Table I 
Percent of Endowment Contributed to the Public Good Per Round 
 
Round 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Regular 40.00 50.67 47.33 37.33 34.67 35.33 35.33 40.67 24.67 32.00 
Penalty 36.89 33.56 34.44 25.33 23.56 20.67 22.67 21.33 17.11 17.11 
Difference 3.11 17.11 12.89 12.00 11.11 14.67 12.67 19.33 7.56 14.89 
 
Figure I graphs the same information and plainly shows that, in each round, 
average contributions in the Penalty Condition were lower than average contributions in 
the Regular Condition. It follows that overall average contributions were lower in the 
Penalty Condition than in the Regular Condition. 
8 Raw data is attached as Appendix B. 
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Figure I 
Percent of Endowment Contributed to the Public Good Per Round 
 
Average contributions in the Regular Condition conform to the pattern of earlier 
experiments, with cooperation in round 1 of 40 percent, decaying to 24.67 percent in 
round 9 before ticking back up to 32 percent in round 10. The overall average 
contributions in the Regular Condition were 37.8%, with a standard deviation of .179. 
Compare this to Zelmer’s (2003) meta-analysis, in which the weighted-mean group size 
was 6.6, the weighted-mean number of rounds was 10.6, and the weighted-mean average 
contribution was 37.7% of the subject’s endowment. 
For a specific example, compare these results to Andreoni (1995a), in which he 
divided subjects into groups of five and had them play ten rounds of a public goods game 
with a marginal per capita return of 0.5. There, Regular Condition subjects contributed 
56.0% of their endowments in round one, decaying to 26.5% by round ten. Andreoni 
(1995b) saw initial contributions of 47.5% decay to 20.9% in round ten. 
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Average contributions in the Penalty Condition are noticeably lower. By round 4 
the subjects are contributing less than 30% and by round 5 they contribute less than 20%. 
The overall average contributions in the Penalty Condition were almost exactly a third 
lower than the Regular Condition at 25.3%, with a standard deviation of .168. 
Medians contributions tell a similar story. As depicted in Table II, median 
contributions are the same in the first round, but for each subsequent round, median 
contributions in the Penalty Condition are lower than median contributions in the Regular 
Condition. 
Table II 
Median Contribution to the Public Good Per Round 
 
Round 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Regular 40.00 50.00 50.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 20.00 30.00 20.00 30.00 
Penalty 40.00 30.00 30.00 10.00 20.00 20.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 
Difference 0.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 20.00 10.00 30.00 
 
Figure II graphs the same information and illustrates the difference in median 
contributions across conditions.  
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Figure II 
Median Contribution to the Public Good Per Round 
 
2. Subjects’ free riding 
Throughout the public goods game literature, the number of subjects free riding 
(contributing zero to the public good) increases over repeated treatments. That pattern 
appears here under both conditions, with both conditions showing a general trend toward 
increasing free riding over the course of the treatment. Table III shows the percentage of 
subjects contributing zero in each round. 
Table III 
Percent of Subjects Contributing Zero to the Public Good Per Round 
 
Round 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Regular 0.0 0.0 6.7 6.7 13.3 13.3 13.3 6.7 20.0 20.0 
Penalty 11.1 15.6 17.8 31.1 31.1 37.8 40.0 35.6 42.2 60.0 
Difference 
-
11.1 
-
15.6 
-
11.1 
-
24.4 
-
17.8 
-
24.4 
-
26.7 
-
28.9 
-
22.2 
-
40.0 
 
 41 
 
By round 3, over 30% of the Penalty Condition subjects free ride, which is a 
higher rate than the Regular Condition subjects reach in any one round. By the end of the 
experiment, a majority of Penalty Condition subjects free ride. 
Figure III shows the same information and once again shows a consistent 
difference between the two conditions: the percentage of subjects contributing zero in the 
Penalty Condition is higher than the percentage of subjects contributing zero in the 
Regular Condition and that this is true across all ten rounds. It follows that the overall 
percentage of subjects contributing zero in a round is higher in the Penalty Condition than 
in the Regular Condition. 
Figure III 
Percent of Subjects Contributing Zero to the Public Good Per Round 
 
Contributions of zero, a.k.a. free riding, are visibly higher in the Penalty 
Condition. By round 4 more than 30% are free riding, which is more than any round in 
the Regular Condition. By the end of the experiment, more than half of the subjects in the 
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penalty condition were free riding. In fact, in round 10, subjects in the Penalty Condition 
were three times as likely to free ride as their counterparts in the Regular Condition. 
3. Subjects’ contributions above the “breach” level 
Average contributions and free riding are fairly standard measurements of public 
goods experiment outcomes, but this experiment is unique in applying a penalty for 
contributing above a specified level. Accordingly, it might also be interesting to see 
whether the penalty had a significant effect on contributions above the level that would 
incur such a penalty. Table IV shows the percentage of subjects in each condition that 
contributed more than 6 tokens (the level that incurs a penalty under the Penalty 
Condition) in a given round of the treatment. 
Table IV 
Percent of Subjects Contributing Above the "Breach" Level to the Public 
Good (Thus Incurring a Penalty If Applicable) Per Round 
 
Round 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Regular 20.00 33.33 40.00 26.67 33.33 20.00 26.67 33.33 6.67 20.00 
Penalty 8.89 11.11 13.33 13.33 4.44 2.22 8.89 6.67 4.44 8.89 
Difference 11.11 22.22 26.67 13.33 28.89 17.78 17.78 26.67 2.22 11.11 
 
Indeed, we see that in every round, the percentage of subjects contributing 6 or 
more tokens is higher in the Regular Condition than in the Penalty Condition. The breach 
level may have created an anchor value of sorts for subjects in the Penalty Condition. 
However, for subjects in the Regular Condition, there was no significance to this number. 
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Figure IV 
Percent of Subjects Contributing Above the "Breach" Level to the Public 
Good (Thus Incurring a Penalty If Applicable) Per Round 
 
Figure IV provides a visual analysis of above-breach-level contributions. 
Interestingly, contributions at these levels do not clearly decay over the course of the 
experiment in either condition (although overall they appear to trend downward, they do 
so very slightly).  
C. Tests of hypotheses.  
1. Subjects’ average contributions 
The first three hypotheses proposed in this paper9 relate to subjects’ contribution 
levels. As Table I and Figure I show, subjects in the Penalty Condition contribute less in 
every round (and therefore, overall) than subjects in the Regular Condition, so hypothesis 
H3 (the penalty will increase contributions) can be immediately rejected. However, it is 
9 See section II.D. 
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not immediately clear that H2 (penalty will decrease contributions) prevails until we can 
reject H1 (overall-null). 
To do that, I compare conditions by analyzing the average contributions of each 
subject across all ten rounds of the experiment, following Andreoni (1996) and others in 
applying the Mann-Whitney rank-sum U-test. The results, shown in Table V, show that 
the null can be rejected with a high degree of certainty. 
Table V 
Significance of the 
Difference Between Groups 
by Average Contribution 
Per Subject 
  
Null 
Average 
Contributions 
Sig. 0.016 
Reject 
null at p 
< .05 ? 
Yes 
Reject 
null at p 
< .10 ? 
Yes 
2. Subjects’ per-round contributions 
The second set of three hypotheses proposed in this paper are directed toward 
contribution levels in individual rounds. Again, Table I and Figure I show that subjects in 
the Penalty Condition contribute less in every round than subjects in the Regular 
Condition, so hypothesis H6 (oneround-increase) can also be immediately rejected. But 
again, H4 (oneround-null) must be rejected before concluding that H5 (oneround-
reduction) was correct. 
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Applying Mann-Whitney to each round, it appears that the null can be rejected in 
some rounds at the .05 level, but this is not the case in all rounds. Table VI shows the 
rounds in which the null can be rejected at the .05 and .10 levels. 
Table VI 
Significance Levels for Per-Round Contribution Difference among Groups 
           Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sig. 0.334 0.012 0.068 0.052 0.071 0.030 0.078 0.011 0.115 0.014 
Reject null 
at p < .05 ? 
No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Reject null 
at p < .10 ? 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 
Perhaps with additional treatments, these significance levels could be increased. 
Interestingly, by far the least significant difference between the two conditions appears in 
the first round. This suggests that the presence of the penalty does not suppress initial 
contributions, but rather that the penalty accelerates the decay toward zero. 
3. Subjects’ free riding 
The third set of three hypotheses addresses contribution levels of zero. Table III 
and Figure III show that a higher percentage of subjects in the Penalty Condition 
contributes zero in every round than subjects in the Regular Condition do, so hypothesis 
H9 (nonzero-increase) can also be immediately rejected. As before, H7 (nonzero-null) 
must be rejected before concluding that H8 (oneround-reduction) was correct. 
Applying Mann-Whitney to each subjects’ average number of zero-level 
contributions across all ten rounds, it appears that the null can be rejected at the .05 level. 
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Table VII shows that the null can be rejected at the .05 and .10 levels. In fact, the 
penalty’s effect on free riding is even significant at the .01 level. 
Table VII 
Significance of the 
Difference Between Groups 
by Average Number of Non-
Zero Contributions Per 
Subject 
  
Null 
Non-zero 
Contributions 
Sig. 0.002 
Reject 
null at  
p < .05 
? 
Yes 
Reject 
null at p 
< .10 ? 
Yes 
4. Subjects’ contributions above the “breach” level 
The final set of hypotheses deals with contributions above the level that would 
incur a penalty for contributing too much. Table IV and Figure IV show that a lower 
percentage of subjects in the Penalty Condition contributes zero in every round than 
subjects in the Regular Condition do, so hypothesis H12 (abovebreachlevel-increase) can 
be immediately rejected. As before, H11 (abovebreachlevel-reduction) can only be 
adopted after rejecting H10 (abovebreachlevel-null). 
Applying Mann-Whitney to each subjects’ average number of above-breach-level 
contributions across all ten rounds, it appears that the null cannot be rejected at the .05 
level. Table VIII shows that the null cannot be rejected at the .05 level, although it can be 
rejected at the 10 level. Accordingly, this result is merely suggestive. 
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Table VIII 
Significance of the 
Difference Between Groups 
by Average Number of 
Penalty-Incurring 
Contributions Per Subject 
  
Null 
Penalty-incurring 
Contributions 
Sig. 0.083 
Reject 
null at p 
< .05 ? 
No 
Reject 
null at p 
< .10 ? 
Yes 
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 Chapter V. DISCUSSION.  
A. Discussion of results of application of method.  
The sample size was somewhat disappointing. Nonetheless, it turned out to be 
large enough to generate statistically significant results, as described below. 
The unofficial treatments conducted on the graduate-level applied economics 
class paid off. The feedback from that class led to refinements to the instructions that 
appear to have made them significantly clearer. After reading the instructions aloud in 
each session, I asked the subjects whether they had any questions. Although subjects 
asked questions in most sessions, subjects did not repeatedly ask the same questions 
across sessions. This suggests that there was not a particularly confusing aspect to the 
instructions. 
B. Discussion of descriptive analysis. 
The descriptive analysis is strikingly clear. In terms of absolute contribution 
levels, subjects in the Regular Condition contribute more overall, and in each round, than 
subjects in the Penalty Condition. This suggests that the presence of the penalty is 
lowering contribution levels, although with just this analysis, it could be due to a 
clustering below the breach point that brings down the average contributions. That is, it is 
possible that subjects are starting out with lower contributions and converging toward 
zero at the same rate, as if the Penalty Condition subjects have a head start.  
The subjects’ median contributions show the same level of initial contribution, but 
lower contributions in the Penalty Condition thereafter. The median contributions show 
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more clearly that the presence of the penalty has an effect on contributions that are well 
below the level that would trigger the penalty, because none of the median contributions 
would have triggered the penalty, yet the difference between median contributions in the 
Regular and Penalty Conditions (depicted in Figure II) is clear. 
Relatedly, Penalty Condition subjects are more likely to completely free ride (by 
contributing nothing) than Regular Condition subjects, both overall and even in each 
round. But again, this could be because of the Penalty Condition subjects’ high marginal 
cost of contributing above the breach level, which gives those subjects the “head start” 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. However, average initial contributions are fairly 
similar across conditions. Further, looking at the data in Figure III, it appears that the 
number of zero contributions increases at a much faster rate in the Penalty Condition than 
in the Regular Condition. This seems to contradict the “head start” hypothesis, suggesting 
instead that the presence of the penalty affects contributions on an ongoing basis, even 
past the point where it would no longer apply in the Regular Condition. That is, whatever 
causes contributions to converge toward zero is apparently enhanced by the presence of 
the penalty. 
That is not to say that the penalty only affects below-breach contributions. Figure 
IV shows quite clearly that above-breach level contributions happen two-to-four times 
more frequently in each round in the Regular Condition than in the Penalty Condition. 
This indicates that subjects appreciate and are sensitive to the high marginal cost of 
contributing above the breach level and that they are lowering their contributions 
accordingly.  
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However, that sensitivity alone does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the 
more-rapid decay toward zero shown by subjects in the Penalty Condition. If it did, the 
zero-contribution rate would increase in parallel. Therefore, it appears that the mere 
presence of the penalty lowers contribution rates even for subjects who, in the Regular 
Condition, would have contributed below the breach level. 
Andreoni (1995a) tested the old assumption that subjects contribute too much 
because they are confused about the rules of the game. Interestingly, the Penalty 
Condition subjects’ contributions were more closely in line with the theoretical prediction 
and dominant strategy of contributing zero. However, their rules were slightly more 
complicated, which suggests that the Regular Condition subjects’ increased cooperation 
was not the result of confusion. 
C. Discussion of tests of hypothesis.  
The difference in overall contributions between the two conditions is quite 
significant, and counsel strongly in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis. This indicates 
that the penalty is very likely the cause of the overall reduction in contributions in 
comparison to the Regular Condition. If the experiment modeled corporate managers’ 
incentives correctly, this suggests that fiduciary duties may indeed constrain corporate 
managers from acting in social optimal ways. 
Round by round, the differences were less significant (see Table VI), though 
Penalty Condition subjects contributed significantly less in four rounds at the .05 level, 
and eight out of ten rounds at the .10 level. Interestingly, the only two rounds with p > 
.10 were the first round and the ninth round. In the latter, the Regular Condition subjects 
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saw a sudden, unusual dip in contribution levels that brought them closer to the Penalty 
Condition levels. Setting aside the ninth round as a random oddity, it is notable that 
contributions in the first round showed the least significant difference across conditions. 
Throughout the literature, contribution levels reliably decrease over time, so the highest 
contribution levels should be observed at the beginning of the experiment. I expected that 
that was when the penalty’s effect would have been highest because it would have 
discouraged high initial contributions. To the contrary, the penalty had the least 
significant effect in the first round, and had more significant effects later in the 
experiment. This indicates that the penalty is affecting more than just above-breach-level 
contributions, and that in fact it is lowering contribution levels that would have been 
below breach level without the penalty. 
The difference between zero and non-zero contributions across conditions is 
extremely significant—easily passing muster even at the .01 level. This, along with the 
data in Table III and Figure III, indicates that a penalty has a substantial effect on 
reducing contribution levels, even when those contribution levels are not close to the 
penalty-incurring breach level. In this experiment, contributions of 5 or less were not 
penalized, yet subjects in the Penalty Condition were far more likely to contribute zero in 
a given round than subjects in the Regular Condition are. This cannot be mere sensitivity 
to the increased marginal cost of the sixth token contributed, because that should not 
cause a subject to contribute so much less than the breach level that the subject reaches 
zero. For example, a subject that would have contributed 6 in the Regular Condition 
might contribute 4 or 5 in the Penalty Condition to get a similar marginal return. Rather, 
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this is evidence that the penalty affects even contributions that would have been below 
breach level, regardless of condition. 
On the other hand, Table VIII shows that the difference in above-breach 
contributions in the Regular Condition versus the Penalty Condition is suggestive, but not 
conclusive (it is significant at the .10 level but not the .05 level). This tells us that there 
are probably subjects for whom the penalty took the form of an increased marginal cost 
of the sixth token and adjusted their contributions downward accordingly.  
This combination of effects on above-breach contribution levels and on zero 
contribution levels suggests that there may be two effects: one of marginal cost, and 
another, harder to pin down effect: the penalty lowers contribution levels even from 
subjects who, in the absence of the penalty, would have contributed an amount below the 
breach level in the Regular Condition. 
D. Post-hoc analysis.  
The error in the first session of the Penalty Condition, in which subjects were 
mistakenly not penalized in rounds 2 through 4, does not seem to have contaminated the 
data in that session. In that session, subjects contributed, on average, 29.0% of their 
endowments, compared to 28.8%, 32.7%, and 41.9% contributions in subsequent 
sessions. The average contribution for all non-error sessions was 34.5%. Under a Mann–
Whitney u-test, the difference between the first session average per-subject contributions 
and all other Penalty Condition average per-subject contributions is not significant, with a 
p value of .656. 
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 Chapter VI. CONCLUSION.  
This study has attempted to answer the question of whether corporate social 
responsibility is being curtailed by fiduciary duties. In an attempt to answer that question, 
two public goods environments were constructed: one traditional and one featuring a 
penalty for contributions above a certain level. Sixty university students were recruited to 
participate in an experiment to test the effect of the change in incentives on overall 
contributions. 
The penalty, a surrogate for the negative consequences that may flow from a 
corporate manager’s breach of fiduciary duties, has an apparent, substantial, and 
significant effect on individual and aggregate contribution levels. This may mean that the 
fiduciary duties placed on corporate managers really are reducing corporate social 
responsibility, and quite possibly reducing overall welfare.  
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APPENDIX A 
DETAILS OF EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
Instructions [Regular] 
This is an experiment in group and individual decision making. Please do not talk with 
one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand. 
You have been randomly assigned to a group of 5 individuals.  You will remain with this 
same group throughout the experiment.  Your identity and individual choices will not be 
revealed to the other members of your group or participants in this experiment.   
The experiment proceeds in 10 rounds. For each round, 
1. Each person in your group receives 10 “chips.” 
2. You decide privately how many of the 10 chips to contribute to a public account.  The 
remainder of the 10 chips will stay in a private account.  You record your 
contributions on the provided record sheet and tear sheet for the current round.  
When you are done, you hand that tear sheet to a monitor. 
3. The monitor returns your tear sheet after writing in the total contribution to the public 
account for your group and your earnings from the public account. 
4. Record your earnings on your record sheet: 
a. Your private account earnings are equal to the remainder (10 minus your 
contribution).  For example, if you contribute 4 chips to the public account, you 
earn 6 chips from keeping them in your private account (10starting – 4contribution = 6 
chips). 
b. However, if contribute more than 5 chips to the public account, your private 
account earnings will be reduced by 2 chips. For example, if you contribute 7 
chips to the public account, you lose two chips from your private account, which 
then earns only 1 chip (10starting – 7contribution – 2penalty = 1 chip). 
c. Your public account earnings are calculated by doubling the total public 
contributions from all your group members and then dividing by 5, so that the 
earnings from the public account are equally distributed to all members of the 
group, regardless of how much you contributed or other members of your group 
contributed.  For example, if the sum of public contributions for your group is 25 
chips, this value is doubled to 50 chips.  These 50 chips are then shared equally, 
so each individual in your group earns 10 chips. 
d. Your total earnings for the round are the sum of your private and public account 
earnings. 
e. A payoff table is enclosed to help you estimate the results of your contribution. 
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We offer a simple payoff table to make it easy for you to calculate your total earnings 
from the group and private accounts.  
PAYOFF TABLE – Your earnings from different combinations of contributions 
  
Group contribution 
Yo
ur
 c
on
tri
bu
tio
n 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
0 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 
1 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 
2 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 
3 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 
5 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 
6 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
7 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 
8 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 
9 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 
10 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
 
Suppose you have contributed 3 chips to the group account and that the total number of 
chips in the group account is 20, then your payoff would be 15.  As a second example, 
suppose you contribute 6 chips and the total group contribution is 35 then your payoff is 
18. Group contributions are shown in multiples of five for simplicity, but other intervals 
are possible. 
After the 10 rounds are completed, we will draw one round at random.  Your cash 
earnings for the experiment will be $10 plus $0.40 times number of chips you earned in 
the randomly selected round.  Record this amount on the provided receipt along with the 
other requested information.  Place this receipt and other materials for the experiment 
back into your folder and wait for your name to be called so you can be paid.   
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
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Instructions [Penalty] 
This is an experiment in group and individual decision making. Please do not talk with 
one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand. 
You have been randomly assigned to a group of 5 individuals.  You will remain with this 
same group throughout the experiment.  Your identity and individual choices will not be 
revealed to the other members of your group or participants in this experiment.   
The experiment proceeds in 10 rounds. For each round, 
5. Each person in your group receives 10 “chips.” 
6. You decide privately how many of the 10 chips to contribute to a public account.  The 
remainder of the 10 chips will stay in a private account.  You record your 
contributions on the provided record sheet and tear sheet for the current round.  
When you are done, you hand that tear sheet to a monitor. 
7. The monitor returns your tear sheet after writing in the total contribution to the public 
account for your group and your earnings from the public account. 
8. Record your earnings on your record sheet: 
a. Your private account earnings are equal to the remainder (10 minus your 
contribution).  For example, if you contribute 4 chips to the public account, you 
earn 6 chips from keeping them in your private account (10starting – 4contribution = 6 
chips). 
b. However, if contribute more than 5 chips to the public account, your private 
account earnings will be reduced by 2 chips. For example, if you contribute 7 
chips to the public account, you lose two chips from your private account, which 
then earns only 1 chip (10starting – 7contribution – 2penalty = 1 chip). 
c. Your public account earnings are calculated by doubling the total public 
contributions from all your group members and then dividing by 5, so that the 
earnings from the public account are equally distributed to all members of the 
group, regardless of how much you contributed or other members of your group 
contributed.  For example, if the sum of public contributions for your group is 25 
chips, this value is doubled to 50 chips.  These 50 chips are then shared equally, 
so each individual in your group earns 10 chips. 
d. Your total earnings for the round are the sum of your private and public account 
earnings. 
e. A payoff table is enclosed to help you estimate the results of your contribution. 
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We offer a simple payoff table to make it easy for you to calculate your total earnings 
from the group and private accounts.  
PAYOFF TABLE – Your earnings from different combinations of contributions 
  
Group contribution 
Yo
ur
 c
on
tri
bu
tio
n 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
0 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 
1 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 
2 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 
3 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 
5 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 
6 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
7 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 
8 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 
9 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 
10 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
 
Suppose you have contributed 3 chips to the group account and that the total number of 
chips in the group account is 20, then your payoff would be 15.  As a second example, 
suppose you contribute 6 chips and the total group contribution is 35 then your payoff is 
18. Group contributions are shown in multiples of five for simplicity, but other intervals 
are possible. 
After the 10 rounds are completed, we will draw one round at random.  Your cash 
earnings for the experiment will be $10 plus $0.40 times number of chips you earned in 
the randomly selected round.  Record this amount on the provided receipt along with the 
other requested information.  Place this receipt and other materials for the experiment 
back into your folder and wait for your name to be called so you can be paid.   
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
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RECORD SHEET  [Regular] 
 
Public
Account
Earnings
1 10 – = + =
2 10 – = + =
3 10 – = + =
4 10 – = + =
5 10 – = + =
6 10 – = + =
7 10 – = + =
8 10 – = + =
9 10 – = + =
10 10 – = + =
=
Total 
for This 
Round
CONTRIBUTIONS EARNINGS
Period Starting 
Chips
–
Public 
Account 
Contribution
=
Private 
Account 
Remainder
+
Private 
Account 
Remainder
 
RECORD SHEET [Penalty] 
Period
Starting 
Chips –
Public 
Account 
Contribution
=
Private 
Account 
Remainder
Private 
Account 
Remainder
–
Penalty (2 if 
Contribution 
is > 5)
+
Public 
Account 
Earnings
=
Total 
for This 
Round
1 10 – = – + =
2 10 – = – + =
3 10 – = – + =
4 10 – = – + =
5 10 – = – + =
6 10 – = – + =
7 10 – = – + =
8 10 – = – + =
9 10 – = – + =
10 10 – = – + =
EARNINGSCONTRIBUTIONS
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TEAR STRIPS 
A-1      Round 1       Your public account contribution: ____   Total group contributions :            Your payout: 
A-1      Round 2       Your public account contribution: ____   Total group contributions :            Your payout: 
A-1      Round 3       Your public account contribution: ____   Total group contributions :            Your payout: 
A-1      Round 4       Your public account contribution: ____   Total group contributions :            Your payout: 
A-1      Round 5       Your public account contribution: ____   Total group contributions :            Your payout: 
A-1      Round 6       Your public account contribution: ____   Total group contributions :            Your payout: 
A-1      Round 7       Your public account contribution: ____   Total group contributions :            Your payout: 
A-1      Round 8       Your public account contribution: ____   Total group contributions :            Your payout: 
A-1      Round 9       Your public account contribution: ____   Total group contributions :            Your payout: 
A-1      Round 10     Your public account contribution: ____   Total group contributions :            Your payout: 
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FLYER 
We are looking for volunteers to participate in an economics experiment on Investment 
Decision Making.  The experiment will take about 50 minutes.  You will be paid for your 
participation.  At a minimum, you will earn $10, but with good decision making and a 
little bit of luck you could earn almost $20.  The experiment will be held in four sessions 
this Saturday, February 14th in Blegen Hall at the following times: 9:30 A.M., 10:45 
A.M., and 12:00 P.M. If you are interested in participating please email me your 
preferred time(s) at biesa002@umn.edu. I will send you a reminder email with 
confirmation and additional information.  There is limited space in each session, so 
please sign up early! If you have any questions, you can email or call me at 612-598-
4917. Thanks, Zach Biesanz 
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Sign-up sheet for participation in economic experiment about investment decisions 
[Sample] 
I request your participation in my economic experiment as part of my thesis research. The 
experiment will take place in four runs on Friday, February 13. You can expect to earn at least 
$10 and a maximum of $20 during the 50-minute session. Your payoff will depend partly on the 
choices you make and partly on chance. The experiment will be entirely anonymous. Please 
indicate your willingness to participate by writing your name and email below. You can only 
participate once. I appreciate your willingness to participate. Feel free to contact me with 
questions you might have about the experiment and how the results are being used in the future at 
biesa002@umn.edu or 612-598-4917. Thank you, Zach Biesanz 
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APPENDIX B 
RAW DATA 
Session Subject Condition Round Average 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 A1 Regular 5 7 7 2 7 8 6 7 3 5 5.7 
1 A2 Regular 4 4 5 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 2.6 
1 A3 Regular 3 5 5 4 7 5 5 5 3 6 4.8 
1 A4 Regular 5 4 2 3 2 3 4 2 2 4 3.1 
1 A5 Regular 6 10 6 7 6 6 7 7 6 6 6.7 
1 B1 Regular 2 5 4 3 4 5 2 3 2 3 3.3 
1 B2 Regular 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 2 1.7 
1 B3 Regular 6 8 7 8 3 3 9 3 5 3 5.5 
1 B4 Regular 5 7 9 7 6 7 4 5 4 5 5.9 
1 B5 Regular 6 6 7 6 6 5 8 7 5 0 5.6 
1 C1 Regular 2 3 0 1 0 0 1 10 0 0 1.7 
1 C2 Regular 4 4 4 4 3 4 0 0 1 0 2.4 
1 C3 Regular 5 3 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1.6 
1 C4 Regular 2 3 3 4 1 3 2 1 0 1 2 
1 C5 Regular 3 5 7 2 3 1 0 6 4 10 4.1 
2 A1 Penalty 4 4 4 0 2 3 4 4 3 4 3.2 
2 A2 Penalty 5 9 5 1 0 0 10 5 3 4 4.2 
2 A3 Penalty 3 4 2 1 5 3 2 1 1 0 2.2 
2 A4 Penalty 4 4 5 1 5 4 4 4 4 0 3.5 
2 A5 Penalty 2 3 2 4 2 2 3 3 2 2 2.5 
2 B1 Penalty 3 5 4 5 2 1 1 1 2 1 2.5 
2 B2 Penalty 4 3 1 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 1.3 
2 B3 Penalty 4 5 1 2 0 3 3 3 0 0 2.1 
2 B4 Penalty 3 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 3 0 1.1 
2 B5 Penalty 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 10 1.5 
2 C1 Penalty 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 
2 C2 Penalty 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
2 C3 Penalty 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 
2 C4 Penalty 5 1 10 1 3 5 5 1 2 0 3.3 
2 C5 Penalty 4 5 4 6 5 4 8 3 4 2 4.5 
3 A1 Penalty 2 0 3 3 2 0 1 4 0 0 1.5 
3 A2 Penalty 4 2 8 8 3 4 5 1 1 1 3.7 
3 A3 Penalty 3 2 6 0 1 5 0 1 1 5 2.4 
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3 A4 Penalty 2 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 4 1 
3 A5 Penalty 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 0.5 
3 B1 Penalty 5 4 5 4 5 3 4 3 5 4 4.2 
3 B2 Penalty 4 10 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.8 
3 B3 Penalty 4 4 5 3 2 0 1 5 3 7 3.4 
3 B4 Penalty 3 4 3 4 0 5 1 3 2 3 2.8 
3 B5 Penalty 3 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0.8 
4 A1 Penalty 2 4 5 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 1.5 
4 A2 Penalty 2 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 
4 A3 Penalty 4 0 5 4 0 5 2 1 0 0 2.1 
4 A4 Penalty 3 3 2 1 5 2 0 1 2 0 1.9 
4 A5 Penalty 3 4 1 0 5 0 1 0 2 0 1.6 
4 C1 Penalty 0 3 2 3 5 2 0 1 2 0 1.8 
4 C2 Penalty 5 1 0 6 0 1 0 5 1 0 1.9 
4 C3 Penalty 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 1.2 
4 C4 Penalty 0 4 10 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 2.7 
4 C5 Penalty 7 4 3 4 10 5 4 2 3 4 4.6 
5 B1 Penalty 5 7 2 3 5 4 0 1 1 0 2.8 
5 B2 Penalty 10 10 10 0 0 0 5 10 0 0 4.5 
5 B3 Penalty 4 4 5 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 1.9 
5 B4 Penalty 3 2 3 1 4 0 2 0 2 0 1.7 
5 B5 Penalty 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 D1 Penalty 10 5 3 10 1 2 2 4 3 0 4 
5 D2 Penalty 4 3 5 4 4 2 5 4 7 10 4.8 
5 D3 Penalty 4 3 1 5 4 0 7 2 5 3 3.4 
5 D4 Penalty 4 2 5 1 2 4 0 3 3 1 2.5 
5 D5 Penalty 5 5 5 2 2 2 5 0 0 0 2.6 
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